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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to investigate links between the strength and type of social
networks, as a collective or community characteristic, and private forest conservation activity in
rural Nepal. Using rural household data from the Nepal Living Standards Survey, this paper
tests the effects of alternative social network (SN) indices on the number of trees planted on
private land. To handle excess zeros and overdispersion in the data, we use the zero-inflated
negative binomial (ZINB) model, while testing and correcting for endogeneity in the SN indices.
Findings are consistent with the theory that social networks, such as community forest user
groups, can have positive effects not just on community forest management but also spillovers or
externality effects that enhance private conservation effort. This generalization requires careful
qualification. Social networks directly related to conservation activities increase tree planting on
private land. Whereas, social networks not related to conservation activities exhibit rivalry.
While there has been considerable discussion in the planning and development literature about
building and enhancing social networks, the policy implication is that not all social networks are
created equal when it comes to enhancing critical conservation activities.

Keywords: Count data models; Forest conservation; Household survey; Nepal; Social networks.
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Investigating the Impact of Social Networks on
Household Forest Conservation Effort in Rural Nepal

I. Introduction
Agriculture remains the most important sector in Nepal’s economy, and is characterized by its
interdependence with forests as a source of farm inputs (CBS 2004: 39). The majority of Nepalese
households are dependent on forests as a source of firewood for household energy and of fodder for
livestock. Given population growth and political turmoil there remains considerable pressure on
forest resources. Despite the paucity of good data, the total amount of forested area in Nepal is
believed to be decreasing. As any quick Internet search will show, there are a wide variety of
international groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that focus, among other things, on
supporting tree planting in Nepal. The significant growth of community forests, and associated
common property management regimes and user groups, in Nepal has been an important and fairly
recent development (i.e., post 1990). However, in terms of relative size, encouraging reforestation
and afforestation on privately-owned land at the household level may be the missing piece in the
forest conservation puzzle (NPC 1998). The question is whether social networks, such as community
forest user groups, can have positive effects not just on community forest management but also
spillovers or externality effects through information flows that enhance private conservation effort.
The objective of this paper is to investigate possible links between the strength and type of
social networks, as a collective or community characteristic, and private forest conservation activity
in rural Nepal. To do so, we investigate a specific household-level forest conservation activity,
namely number of trees planted on private land, with a large, representative rural sample and a
detailed set of alternative constructions of social networks indices. Although somewhat dated (1996),
given the political turmoil in Nepal, we use the most recent publicly-available household data on the
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issue from a broad representative sample. Previous studies are either focused on firewood collection
(Baland 2002), as a crude (and often inversely related) proxy for conservation activities, or on various
community-level activities with small samples (Bluffstone 1995; Varughese and Ostrom 2001;
Edmonds 2002; Pokharel 2003; Adhikari et al. 2004). Using a variety of count data modeling
approaches, we test both the strength and the effect of alternative constructions of social network
indices on the household decision to plant trees on their private land, conditioned on the
characteristics of the household and the community where it is located. Specifically, we use the zeroinflated negative binomial (ZINB) model, while also testing and correcting for endogeneity in the
social network indices. At a general level, we find consistent and positive relationships between the
strength (or density) of social networks and tree planting on private land. There is, however, strong
evidence that social networks that are not directly related to forest conservation exhibit rivalry; i.e.,
not all social networks are created equally when it comes to promoting reforestation and afforestation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A brief summary of the evolution
of forest management in Nepal is presented in Section II. Section III presents a short review of
literature concerning social networks and probable links to conservation activities. A simple
analytical framework is presented in section IV. Section V describes the data and the
construction of the various social network indices. Section VI explains the modeling approaches
and hypotheses. Section VII presents the empirical results, and section VIII concludes with
discussion and policy implications.

II. Evolution of Forest Management in Nepal: Brief Summary
Prior to 1950, the Oligarchy Rana rulers considered Nepal’s forests as their private property
and used it exclusively for their private benefits. With the 1950’s democratic transition, the Forest
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Act of 1957 nationalized all types of forests. Under the new system, political and administrative
institutions were either weak or non-existent in all levels of governance and hence absence of the rule
of law. Thus, in the absence of effective enforcement of newly created state property regimes,
nationalized forests became open access resources for all practical proposes. As a result, Nepal
experienced massive deforestation. To wit, available statistics show that about 45 percent of the land
area was covered by forest until 1964, but by the end of 1998 only 29 percent of the total area was
under forest coverage (NPC 1998: 290).1
Forest management and conservation is a complex issue in the Nepalese context. Besides
preserving biodiversity, preventing soil erosion in hilly and mountain regions,2 and facilitating
1

Before 1950, Nepal was ruled for over a century by a family called the Ranas. This system was

overthrown in 1950 in favor of multi-party democracy. After 10 years experimentation with
multi-party democracy, a party-less political system was introduced in 1960 that lasted for the
next 30 years. With the popular movement of 1990, multi-party democracy was reintroduced,
which paved the way for tremendous growth in the formation and influence of NGOs. NGO
activities are believed to have helped to increase social networks through formation of different
user groups (e.g. forests user groups, water user groups) and management associations. More
recently, the last eight years have witnessed considerable unrest in Nepal, with an unstable
government in the center and insurgency in the rural areas. Consequently, NGO activities and
forest officials are believed to be confined to district headquarters due to the fear of prosecution
by the rebel insurgents. There is concern that this might lead to further deforestation. For recent
discussions about Nepal’s political situation, see the list-serve archives at:
http://www.liberaldemocracynepal.org
2

Hills and mountains comprise over 80% of the total area of Nepal.
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watershed management, forests provide inputs for agriculture, fodder for livestock, and firewood for
household use. A key feature of Nepal’s agriculture, which provides employment to over 71% of the
population, and accounts for 55% of rural household income, is its heavy dependence on forests and
livestock for farm inputs. Preliminary summary results from a recent Nepal living standard survey
(CBS 2004: 31-44) show that 84% of households use firewood for cooking, and 75% collect fodder
for livestock from forests.3 Coupled with high population growth, such heavy reliance of daily living
on forests and related products is a primary source of deforestation in Nepal.4
As a result of massive deforestation, Nepal forest management issues have received
considerable attention. After the 1990 political change, the government of Nepal introduced the
Forest Act of 1993, which categorized forests into two main classes: national forests and private
forests. The national forests are further divided into five sub-classes: community forests, leasehold
forests, government-managed forests, religious forests, and protected forests (FAO 2000). Among
different types of forests, the management of community forests through local user groups has been
regarded as a relative success story (NPC 2002).5 It is generally believed that the trend of massive
deforestation in Nepal has been slowed to some extent after transferring a considerable amount of
local forest to the rural communities. The main idea of community forestry is to allocate the property
3

The average Nepalese household had 14 head of livestock in 2003, excluding poultry and pigs

(CBS 2004: 19).
4

Illegal clearance of forests for timber and agricultural land, and legal clearance due to

government resettlement programs are other main causes of deforestation. It is argued that the
occurrence of such activities has increased due to political instability over past several years.
5

The first formal community forestry program in the country was introduced in 1978. But its

impact remained very limited through the 1980s (Gilmour 2003).
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rights of the local forest resources to communities to be managed locally. Community forestry has
affected both a significant portion of the total forest area and total population in Nepal (CBS 2002: 7).
Recent data shows that over 12,000 user groups have managed more than 850,000 hectors (ha) of
community forests. In relative terms, community forests comprise 16% of total forest area in Nepal,
and it is estimated that 20% of households have directly benefited from them (Pokharel, 2003). Thus,
any understanding of forest conservation efforts in Nepal must consider the formation of communitylevel management groups with participation by local stakeholders through Community Forest User
Groups (CFUGs), and assessing the role of CFUGs in managing (provision and appropriation)
common property resources. The provision problem deals with maintaining the stock of the
community forest, whereas appropriation relates to sharing the benefit from it (Balasubramanian and
Selvaraj 2003). Either way, the role of CFUGs (a type of social network), has a direct bearing on
ecological and economic benefits.
Nevertheless, despite the perceived success of community forests, it is estimated that Nepal
lost 17% of total forested area and 18% of natural forested area during 1990-2000; while during the
same period, there was only 5% increase in tree-planted area (World Resource Institute 2004),
indicating net loss in total forested area in the range of 12% over the decade. Such evidence indicates
that emphasis on community forests alone may be unlikely to prevent continued deforestation in
Nepal.6,7 To put this in perspective, while the benefits of community forestry may have positively

6

Using a small sample survey in the Dang district, Sakurai et al. (2004) find that in the case of

forest management in Nepal, neither private management nor community management
completely dominates the other; it is argued that timber management is more efficient under
private ownership, while tree protection is more efficient under community management.
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affected a significant proportion of the population, the national forests transferred under community
forests so far remains smaller (16%) than the forested area that was lost (18%) within a decade (19902000). Thus, there is a critical need for a sustained focus on reforestation and afforestation through
encouraging tree planting of rural households on their own private land-holdings to meet daily living
requirements for forest products. Further, the relative importance of facilitating tree planting on
private land is seen in that about 79% of total households in Nepal (based on NLSS 1995/96) were
rural, of which about 87% were agricultural households owning private land. More recent estimates
indicate that only two percent of total Nepal households are agricultural households without land
(CBS 2004: 3).8 The open question, therefore, is whether the social networks (i.e., the CFUGs),
which are part and parcel of community forests (and the associated common property management
regimes), also have a positive externality effect on tree planting on private land holdings.

III. Overview of Social Network Linkages
Social networks, a component of social capital in a community, have commonly been
considered as a source of positive spillovers or externalities (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993). It is
argued that social networks help to increase the productive efficiency of society. As Arrow states
(1993:3), “there seems to be widespread consensus on the plausibility of the hypothesis that social
7

Evidence from Ethiopia suggests that trees are more actively planted under private management

than community management (Gebremedhin et al. 2003).
8

In 1995/96 approximately 83% of total households were “with land” (owned or rented) in

Nepal. This number has decreased somewhat to 78% in 2003/04. The percentage of households
operating less than 0.5 hector was 40% in 1995/96, and had increased to 45% in 2003/04 (CBS
2004: Chap IX p.1)
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networks can affect economic performance.” Most simply it is argued that better-connected people
enjoy higher returns. Social networks may guard against coordination failure --a long known
problem in private economic enterprises, and may provide safety nets to members. For example,
information may circulate faster within a group than between groups, thus providing opportunities to
take early actions and avoid cost of delay. The argument is that different groups of people focus on
their own actions creating an information gap between groups. Such gaps have been referred to as
structural holes (Burt 2001). The very idea of a social network is to patch the holes between
individuals or groups of individuals so that information flows smoothly and productively at minimum
cost.9
Several studies have shown that conservation and environmental management are
correlated with social networks. In a recent comprehensive survey, Pretty and Ward (2001) present
numerous examples of how common actions of local institutions and organizations could contribute
towards sustainable resource management and environmental performance, and how declining local
institutions provoke natural resource degradation. Wu and Pretty (2004) provide an example of how
9

There is no unique definition for social capital, nor is the focus of this paper on trying to sort

between alternative definitions. However, one widely accepted principal component of social
capital is the notion of social networks. For example, Coleman (1988: S95-S120) describes
social capital as features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action. See also, Burt (2001) who
discusses two network structures that have been argued to create social capital, namely structural
holes and network closure; both concepts refer to the fact that social capital is embedded in
social networks. Other important aspects of social capital are relation and trust, reciprocity and
exchanges, and common rules, norms and sanctions (Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999).
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local social networks (farmer innovation circles in rural China) can promote conservation activities in
a remote rural region. Using data from 18 different community forestry sites in Nepal, Varughese
and Ostrom (2001) find that forest condition is positively correlated with the degree of collective
activities of forest user groups. Grafton and Knowles (2003) estimate the effects of social
determinants (social capital, social capacity, and social divergence) on environmental quality using
cross-country data from samples of low, middle and high-income countries. Their findings are
mixed; the existence of social networks is not a sufficient condition for better environmental
outcomes.
Using the NLSS data of rural Nepal, Baland et al. (2002) analyses the relationship between
various dimensions of inequality (measured by the Gini-coefficient of consumption expenditure, land
ownership, and ethnic diversity) and firewood collection, as a proxy for deforestation. They find no
evidence of a significant relationship between firewood collection and fraction of households
associated in forest user groups (FUGs). This may be due to their approach of using fraction of
households associated with FUGs, which is quite narrow, and does not account for the basic
characteristics (strength or density) and effectiveness of the social networks, such as years in
operation, percentage of household involved in networks, and number of meetings per year.10 These
components of user groups can be used as indicators of the strength (or density) of the social
networks. While constructing alterative measures of social network indices, we use all such available
information about the characteristics of different user groups (social networks).

10

Using a different data set from rural Nepal, Edmonds (2000), however, concludes that the presence

of forest user groups reduces a household’s extraction of firewood significantly.

10

NSC Working Paper Series No. 1, 2005

IV. Simple Analytical Framework
Consider a household utility function, U, defined on a generic conservation activity, a,
and a vector of market goods, Z. In terms of utility with and without conservation activity, ith
household decides to participate in the conservation activity if:
(1)

Ui (ai = 1, Zi’) – Ui (ai = 0, Zi) ≥ 0.

Where ai = 1 if ith household participates in the conservation activity, and ai = 0 otherwise. That
is, if the utility from participating in conservation activities, Ui (ai = 1, Zi’), is at least as large as
the utility from without it (Ui (ai = 0, Zi)) such that Zi – Zi’ >0, then the household will
participate, given household resource constraints. The conservation activity choice is such that
(2)

−

ai* = {1 if θ i < θ i , 0 otherwise}

Where θi is the opportunity cost of using private marginal land for conservation, and θ i is the
threshold opportunity cost of conservation to ith household. For example, ith household plants
trees if the actual opportunity cost of doing so in privately owned marginal land falls below their
threshold opportunity cost. We assume that such opportunity cost is an inverse function of the
size of landholding by household. The larger the land size that the ith household owns, the
smaller the opportunity cost of using marginal land for conservation measures, and the greater
the probability that the household undertakes the conservation activity, ceteris paribus.
Once the decision to participate in any specific conservation activity (e.g., tree planting)
is made, the extent or amount of conservation-related effort (e.g., number of trees planted, NT)
depends on the benefits from it, given the household’s characteristics. Formally,
(3)

N Ti = f ( Bi , ρ i )

Where NTi is the number of trees planted by ith household, Bi is the benefits from the
conservation, and ρ i is a vector of ith household characteristics. Further, to analyze the role of
11
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social networks in a community on the level of tree planting of a household, we consider the
following benefit function:
(4)

Bi = B( SN j , Lk ,θ i , φ i ) .

Where, SNj is an index of the strength of social networks in jth community, Lk represents the
characteristics of the kth ecological region in which a household (and its community) resides, θ i
is the opportunity cost of conservation activities defined by the size of land holdings, and φ i is
the extent that the ith household uses forest products in day-to-day activities.11 We assume that
stronger social networks (SN), lower opportunity costs (θ), and higher use of forest products ( φ )
by ith household increase the benefit from tree planting.
It is expected that the strength of a social network in a community affect the benefits
from a conservation activity through information exchange. As a starting point, we can naively
assert that any type of social network index is positively related to the conservation activity.
Therefore, the more inclusive the social network in jth community, the more benefits the ith
household may derive from conservation effort. The household-level of conservation effort
(number of trees planted) is represented by:
(5)

N Ti = f ( SN j , Lk ,θ i , φi , ρi ; β )

We use this framework as a basis of our empirical analysis where β refers to the vector of regression
coefficients to be estimated empirically. More specifically, we want to test whether the strength of a

11

Here, i refers to household, j refers to community, and k refers to ecological region. To

maintain notational simplicity, we denote number of trees planted by ith household in jth
community and kth ecological region by NTi, not by NTijk. We follow similar conventions for
other variables.
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social network present in a community will positively affect household tree-planting behavior on
private land, and whether different types of social network have different effects.

V. Data and Construction of the Social Network Indices

The data for this analysis are drawn from rural sub-sample of the Nepal Living Standards
Survey (NLSS) 1995/96. NLSS (1995/96) consists of comprehensive survey responses covering
different aspects of household welfare. The survey is the outcome of a joint project of the Central
Bureau of Statistics (Nepal) and the World Bank. The full data consists of a national sample of 3373
households (rural and urban). Households were selected from 274 sampling units around the country,
called wards, based on the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS). A two-stage stratified sampling
procedure was used. The data includes about the number of trees planted by the household on their
own private land holdings in the survey year, along with socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of household, and information about various kinds of social networks and associated
community characteristics.
In the rural sub-sample of NLSS, six different types of social organizations or network groups
were reported at the community level. They are forest user groups, farmers groups, water
management associations, women in development groups, credit groups, and ‘other’ groups. For
each of these network groups, the following four categories of information are recorded: years in
operation, number of households (in the given community) involved in a particular organization,
percentage of the women members in a group, and the average numbers of meetings per year. For
our purposes, we construct composite social network indices for different types of groups using all
four pieces of information listed above, which indicate the strength or density of alternative social
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networks. This is in contrast to simply using a single piece of information, or focusing on just the
presence or absence of any given social network in the community.
Define Xnj, min(Xnj) and max(Xnj) as the actual, minimum and maximum values, respectively,
of the nth component of a social network (n = 1 to 4, information categories listed above) in the jth
community. Then the social network index of the mth type (m constructed from a set of one or more
of the six social network types listed above) in jth community, SNmj, is given by
(6)

4

X nj − min( X nj )

n =1

max( xnj ) − min( X nj )

SN mj = ∑

While there may be different ways to construct a social network index, we assume that the larger this
index, the greater the strength of the social network in the community. The four informational
components (n = 1 to 4) of mth network indicate stability (number of years in operation),
inclusiveness (fraction of households in mth social group from jth community and percentage of
women members involved in mth group from jth community), and the effectiveness of groups (number
of meetings of mth group per year in the jth community). Absent any a priori information, we assign
equal weights to all four components in computing aggregate indices.
For singular types of groups (m) identified in the NLSS, there are six different social network
indices that can be constructed. But, types of groups can also be combined to construct alternative
indices. For this empirical investigation, we evaluate four different types of social network indices,
labeled SNF, SNFfW, SNFfWwco, and SNfWwco depending on the nature of the social networks included.12

12

We have six different groups: forest user groups, farmers groups, water management

associations, women in development groups, credit groups, and ‘other’ groups. The index
notations come from the initialization of the name of those six different groups: Forest, farmer,
Water, women, credit, and others.
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We denote the set of these network indices as: Ω = {SNF, SNFfW, SNFfWwco, SNfWwco}. These indices
range from very specific to broad-based in scope. SNF has very narrow coverage (the most
exclusive), relating specifically and solely to forest user groups. SNFfW has medium coverage in
scope, consisting of three different types of social networks– forest user groups, farmers groups, and
water groups (management associations). SNFfWwco has the widest coverage (the most inclusive)
including all six different types of social network groups. SNfWwco is an index of all groups exclusive
of the forest users group. Thus, SNF is expected to be the most directly-related index to forest
conservation effort (e.g., tree planting), and SNFfW and SNfWwco are proper subsets of SNFfWwco.
Moreover, SNfWwco is the only index that is not directly related to forest conservation effort (e.g., tree
planting). Table 1 provides variable definitions and summary statistics for the four social network
indices, as well as for other variables used in the subsequent econometric modeling.

VI. Methods and Hypotheses

The objective of the econometric modeling is to analyze the effect of alternative constructions
of social network indices (SN) on private forest conservation behavior at household-level, while
controlling for basic household socio-demographic and community characteristics. As our measure
of forest conservation effort (available in the NLSS), we use number of trees planted by the rural
household on privately owned land during the survey year. Given that the number of trees any
household plants is a discrete, non-negative integer, use of count data modeling is a natural avenue to
pursue. For example, the commonly-used Poisson model would be a candidate for initial count data
analysis. However, as shown in Table 1 for the number of trees planted (NT) our data suggests that
there is considerable over dispersion as variance exceeds the mean by several-fold, and the data also
contains excessive zeros. Out of 2657 rural households surveyed in NLSS, 2608 households
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responded to the question about tree planting, and about 14.6% responses were positive; only a
relatively small percentage of households engage in the critical forest conservation activity of tree
planting.13 So, the basic Poisson model, which assumes equality between mean and variance, is not a
preferred candidate for the analysis. Alternatively, we try the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial
(ZINB), Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP), and Negative Binomial (NB) models, as Poisson model is
nested in NB and ZIP is nested in ZINB models.14 More specifically, using likelihood ratio test
(Greene 2000) and the Vuong Z-test (Vuong 1989) we identify ZINB as the appropriate model.
The key variables of interest in the right-hand-side of the econometric model are the social
network (SN) indices. However, it might be argued that the strength of a given SN index in a

13

The basic characteristics of households who planted trees during the survey year are as

follows: over 90% of household heads were male with an average age 46.3 years and 4.3 years of
average schooling; average number of trees planted per household was 47.5; average land size
was 1.4 hectares; about 50% of those households were from hills and 37.8% from mountains,
only 12.3% were from terai; the primary source of energy was firewood for 87.7%; only 20.7%
had electricity, and 32.3% were near community forests.
14

Let ωi be the proportion of zeros and if the distribution is over dispersed with excessive zeros,

then, we have (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 125-126): Pr[ NTi = 0] = ω i + (1 − ω i ) exp(− µ i ) , and
Pr[ NTi = r ] = (1 − ω i ) f (r ; µ i , γ ) , where f (r ; µ i , γ ) is a probability distribution separately fitted
to non-zero values. Here, r is number of trees planted (NTi), µi is sample mean, and γ is the
variance parameter for negative binomial (NB) model such that V ( µ ) = µ + γµ 2 . When using
the NB distribution for f (r ; µ i , γ ) , it is referred to as the zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB)
distribution. Note that the limit as γ → 0 is the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) distribution.
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community somehow reflects household choices that are endogenous with the tree planting decision.
To determine whether any or all of the four SN indices are endogenous, we use the Hausman
specification test (Hausman 1978). We assume that participation in social networks is related to the
household’s caste/ethnicity, culture (denoted by the primary language spoken at home to proxy for
social interaction), and religion. We expect that if a household experienced a major natural disaster
or some other similar problems in the past, it is more likely that the household would participate in
social networks as insurance for future problems. Therefore, we use four different variables as the
instruments for the Hausman specification tests: household’s caste/ethnicity, primary language at
home (mother tongue), religion, and whether the household had experienced any major natural
disasters within the past five years. All four of these variables are categorical: CASTE = 1 if
‘Brahmin or Kshitriya,’ else 0; RELIGION = 1 if ‘Hindu,’ else 0; LANGUAGE = 1 if mother tongue
is ‘Nepali,’ else 0; NDISASTER = 1 if the household experienced any major natural disasters within
the past five years, else 0. Descriptive statistics are included in Table 1.
As a kind of initial conjecture, our general alternative hypothesis is that the strength of a
social network of any kind in jth community is positively related to the number of trees planted of the
ith household in that community. Formally, we test the following general alternative hypothesis

against the null hypothesis of no effect of SN indices on tree planting:
H1: β

SN Ω

> 0 for Ω = {F , FfW , FfWwco, fWwco}

This hypothesis states that extent of a social network of any kind may have significant positive effect
on the household’s conservation effort, ceteris paribus. Under this hypothesis, we expect a positive
regression coefficient for SN (equation 5) indices.
Alternatively, our second hypothesis is more nuanced and relates to Coleman’s (1988: S107S108) notion of network closure structure, where he argues that network closure creates

17
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trustworthiness in a social group. This argument implies that exclusive (dense) social networks make
enforcement of group cooperative behavior more effective (Sobel 2002: 150-151). We argue that
inclusive coverage of aggregate social networks does not necessarily imply greater efforts for any
given conservation activity. Inclusive social networks related to, say, poverty alleviation or general
education, will not necessarily produce a greater level of tree planting in our case. This type of
conjecture that social networks may be rival has been made previously by different authors (e.g.
Coleman 1988: S98; Pretty and Ward 2001: 213) without formal empirical testing. Simply, the
argument is that resources and time spent in one type of activity are not available to the alternative
activities, with the implication that different types of social networks may be rival to each other rather
than complements. As social networks have a public good nature (Coleman 1988), their externality
effect is expected to be negative for unrelated activities. Better conservation outcomes may require
an exclusive social network related to the specific conservation activity. This leads to our second
alternative hypothesis that narrower (exclusive) social networks result in a higher level of tree
planting than broader (inclusive) social networks, and social networks not directly related to forest
conservation may have a negative effect on the level of tree planting:
H2: β

SN F

>β

SN FfW

>β

SN FfWwco

and β

SN fWwco

<0

Here we expect positive coefficients for SNF, SNFfW, and SNFfWwco and a negative coefficient for
SNfWwco. We test this alternative hypothesis against the null hypothesis of no effect. It is expected
that not all social networks are created equal -- more inclusive social networks might not be enough
to have a greater level of conservation activity. Our hypothesis is that more inclusive social networks
that are not related (such as SNfWwco) or distantly related (such as SNFfw and SNFfWwco) to forest
conservation might not be helpful to tree planting due to opportunity costs and potential conflicts
between the different objectives of different social networks.
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To partial-out the ceteris paribus relationship between tree planting and social networks we
control for the total land holdings by the household (TOTLAND), as a proxy for the opportunity cost
(θi) of tree-planting to the ith household, and the primary source of energy at the household-level
(FIREWOOD) -- a dummy variable if it is firewood. The latter is a proxy for the demand for forest
product ( φ i ) by ith household. The rationale for using these variables as controls is that the larger
land area proxies for the household’s ability to conserve agroforestry and promote tree planting and
hence low opportunity cost of marginal land, and the use of firewood as primary source of household
energy proxies for the importance of forest products in household welfare. It is expected that a
household puts increased effort in tree planting if the need for forest products is high (βFIREWOOD > 0),
and if the opportunity cost of doing so is lower (βTOTLAND > 0).
In addition, we also controlled for household demographic characteristics, and the general
ecological region where the household is located. We use household size, age of the household head,
and household head’s years of schooling (EDUCATION), as demographic control variables.15
Ecologically, Nepal is divided into three regions: mountain, hills, and terai (flat fertile land). We use
indicator variables for mountain (MOUNTAIN) and terai (TERAI) with hills as the base category to
control for general ecological differences among communities.
In Nepal, electricity is available in urban centers and neighboring villages. About 20% of the
households have access to electricity. Further, maintained road connections (and associated access to
larger markets) are available only in the urban centers and surrounding villages. Thus, we also

15

A variety of other specifications were examined. For example, inclusion of a dummy variable

for the household respondent’s gender does not alter the results.
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include availability of electricity (ELECTRICITY) as a measure of household’s proximity to the
markets and the availability of accessible transportation facilities as control variables.16

VII. Empirical Results

The regression estimates for household-level of conservation are presented in Table 2. All
together we estimate ten different models where the left-hand-side variable is the number of trees
planted (TN) by household. The first eight models are estimated using four different SN indices as
explanatory variable along with two different sets of control variables. The first set of parsimonious
control variables includes EDUCATION, TOTLAND, FIREWOOD, MOUNTAIN, TERAI, and AGE.
The second set of extended control variables includes HHSIZE and ELECTRICITY in the first set.
The main purpose of introducing both parsimonious and extended models with each SN index is to
examine how stable or robust the results are under different specifications of the econometric models.
Each pair of models has common SN index: SNF in Model-IA and Model-IB, SNFfW in Model-IIA and
Model-IIB, SNFfWwco in Model-IIIA and Model-IIIB, and SNfWwco in Model-IVA and Model-IVB. In
the last two columns of Table 2, we present the results from IV-ZINB regression as Hausman
endogeneity test results (significant χ2 values) show that SNF and SNFfW are endogenous in the case of
the parsimonious models (Model-IA and Model-IIA). So, SNF and SNFfW are instrumented to take
care of the endogeneity issue, and results from IV-ZINB are presented under Model-V and Model-VI.
In Table 2 the estimated coefficients for first three social network indices (SNF, SNFfW, and
SNFfWwco) are positive and significant, and then negative and not significant in the case of SNfWwco.
Across all models, the FIREWOOD coefficient is significant and positive as expected, while the sign
16

Pendleton and Howe (2002) find that market integration of rural households in Latin America

results in deforestation in the absence of conservation measures.
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of the TOTLAND coefficient is positive not significant; the estimated coefficient on EDUCATION is
positive and significant. The demographic variable (AGE) has no significant impact.
Relative to the hills region as the control case, the coefficients of the ecological region control
dummy variables are opposite in sign. The coefficient of TERAI, a dummy for the fertile plain area in
the southern part of the country, is negative. The negative sign probably indicates that in the fertile
plain area household would use the land for alternatives like agricultural production as the
−

opportunity cost of tree planting may be higher than the threshold ( θ i > θ i ). In the case of
MOUNTAIN region, the coefficient is positive and significant (except in the case of SNFfWwco)
indicating that tree planting increases for households located in the mountain region.
The sign and significance of the coefficients on the social network indices do not change once
we include additional explanatory variables in extended model specifications (Model-iA vs. ModeliB for i = I, II, III and IV). The results of such extended models are reported under Model-iB in
Table 2. We include additional control variables such as household size (HHSIZE) and the
availability of electricity (ELECTRICITY) in the jth community where ith household is located. The
presence of ELECTRICITY, a proxy for the market access and transportation facility in rural
communities, has a positive effect on tree planting; the estimated coefficient is significant at the10%
level in the case of SNF and SNFfW. The ZINB results appear quite robust, as additional control
variables do not change the sign and significance of the coefficients of the SN indices or the other
control variables.
As explained earlier, we estimate three different competing count data models: ZINB (Zero
Inflated Negative Binomials), ZIP (Zero Inflated Poisson) and NB (Negative Binomials). In all three
cases, the coefficients of social network indices (SNF, SNFfW, and SNFfWwco) have expected signs and
are highly significant with the exception of SNfWwco. Moreover, the coefficients of the major control
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variables have expected signs in all three models. The results and the levels of significance of all four
social network indices, the principal variable in question, do not change when more control variables
are added (Model-iA vs. Model-iB). Additionally, in order to see if some kind of clustering makes
any difference in the standard errors of the coefficients and hence the level of significance, we try two
different types of clustering: around the primary sampling units (PSU) called wards,17 and around the
ecological regions (mountain, hills and terai). It turns out that the clustering of the data in either way
does not change the results.18
All three count-data models (ZINB, NB, and ZIP) appeared to be reasonable for explaining
the conservation activities. To get an idea which of these three models best explains the data, an
attempt has been made to compare the models. The Likelihood Ratio Test (for α = 0 ) allows us to
make comparisons between ZINB and ZIP models, whereas the Vuong-Z score does the same thing
between the ZINB and NB models. Table 2 displays regression results from the ZINB models with
associated values of α and Vuong-Z scores. Chi-square values for the LR tests are highly significant
for all specifications of the models, meaning that ZINB is preferred to the ZIP model. The
significance of the Vuong-Z scores shows that the ZINB is preferred over the NB model. Overall, the
ZINB model better describes the data. Therefore, we present ZINB model results in Table 2.19
Table 2 results generally support the first hypothesis (H1) that social networks help to
increase the number of trees planted by a household. However, the coefficient of SNfWwco, for social
17

Wards are the smallest administrative units at the village level. One village (called village

development committee) has nine wards.
18

The regression results with the clustering around PSU and ecological regions are not presented

here, as there are no significant changes in the basic results.
19

Complete regression results for the ZIP and NB models are available upon request.

22

NSC Working Paper Series No. 1, 2005

networks not related to forest user groups, is negative in the case of Model-IVA and Model-IVB.
Though not significantly different form zero, this result provides at least suggestive support for our
second hypothesis (H2) that social networks not related to conservation activities are rival to tree
planting.20 Table 3 and Table 4 present additional results for testing H2.
In Table 3, we present the size and significance of marginal effects (ME) of different SN
indices on a household’s tree planting. There is a clear pattern. Specifically, results show that the
size of the ME depends on the degree of inclusiveness of the social network indices: ME of SNF >
ME of SNFfW > ME of SNFfWwc > ME of SNfWwco, i.e. a more inclusive SN index has smaller ME. This
pattern of MEs of SN indices holds in both parsimonious (Model-iA) and extended (Model-iB)
models. The last two columns of Table 3 show the MEs of instrumented (IV-SNF and IV-SNFfW) SN
indices. The same pattern, ME of IV-SNF > ME of IV-SNFfW, holds in the case of instrumented SN
indices as well. Thus, overall, we find that the more inclusive (broader) the SN index, the smaller the
marginal effects on tree planting behavior, ceteris paribus.
Table 4 provides information about the magnitude and significance of the difference in MEs
for different SN indices. The issue is whether the size of the ME of an SN index decreases
significantly when coverage of the SN changes from exclusive (SNF) to more inclusive (SNFfWwco).
Here Model-iA refers to the parsimonious models and Model-iB refers to the extended models. In
20

We also try to identify what specific network indices are rival to tree planting. We find that

social networks related to farmers’ groups are rival to tree planting. Other social networks that
exhibit rivalry to conservation activities are related to women groups, credit groups, and ‘other’
groups. Other than forest user groups, water user groups is the only SN index that is non-rival to
tree planting. Once we exclude the social networks related to forest and water user groups, then
the effect of SN on trees planting is always negative and significant.

23

NSC Working Paper Series No. 1, 2005

both cases, the difference between MEs is increasing as we go from exclusive to inclusive SN indices,
and those differences are statistically significant. We can see this pattern in each row in Table 4,
where the difference in MEs is increasing as we move from left to right, indicating that the marginal
effects go down as we move from very exclusive to more inclusive SN indices. The last two columns
of Table 4 give the difference in MEs in the case of instrumented SNF and SNFfW indices, which
should be read separately. These two columns also follow the general trend, as the difference of MEs
in the IV-SNF column is greater than those in column IV-SNFfW.
Our second hypothesis (H2) relates to whether the more inclusive the social network, the
lesser its effect (including turning to a potentially inverse relationship) on tree planting. This is
because the aggregation of different networks may not necessarily be complementary with the desired
objectives. Rather, it becomes more probable that different social networks have conflicting goals,
and resources and time spent in one activity leads to reductions in the availability of resources and
time for other activities. In that case, we expect diminishing returns to the social networks that
involve more inclusive measures, and crowding-out effects if the social network is not related to
conservation activity explicitly (such as SNfWwco). Results from Table 3 and Table 4 indicate that the
more inclusive the social network, the less effective it is in positively affecting trees planting. This
outcome supports hypothesis H2 that social networks that are inclusive but distantly related, or not
related, to forestry user groups have lower or negative impacts on tree planting on private land.

VIII. Conclusions

Community forest user groups (CFUGs) may typically be associated with the common
property management of community forests. But their information and education effects are not
limited to commonly-managed lands. Our findings highlight the positive spillovers or externalities
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that these groups can have on conservation behavior on private land. Using survey-based, rural Nepal
household data on the level of a critical conservation activity -- tree planting on private land, this
research examines the effect of both the strength and type of social network. Results from the
econometric analysis, using zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) count data models with tests and
corrections for endogeneity, are robust and highly significant. Results indicate that social networks
that are directly related to the conservation activity have a positive and significant impact on the
number of trees planted on private land by households. However, social networks that are not
directly related to conservation activities exhibit a kind of rivalry to tree planting on private land, and
inclusive but distantly-related social networks to tree planting have significantly smaller or negative
effects than narrower but exclusive social networks. The inference is that different social networks
have conflicting goals, and resources and time used in one activity will not be available to alternative
activities, or one kind of social network would create its own social relations, possibility interfering
or destroying others (e.g., possible crowding-out effects). These results add to our growing
understanding about social connectedness, and the multiple relationships between social networks
and rural conservation activities (e.g., Wu and Pretty 2004). They also have the potential for
significant policy implications.
Forest products remain essential to everyday life in most Nepalese households, and population
growth will continue to increase pressure on forest resources without sustained increase in their
supply. It is important to emphasize that a relatively small percentage of the households in our large
rural sample engaged in tree planning. Further, the need for identifying the most effective
conservation programs is only exacerbated by the current political instability in Nepal. While the
political situation may be highly uncertain, and perhaps may remain so for some time, relatively
recent Nepalese government planning objectives have included: (1) increasing the total area under the
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forest cover to at least 40%, which is assumed to be the minimum requirement for sustainable soil
conservation, preservation of biodiversity, and watershed management (NPC 2002: 180-199); and (2)
reducing the dependency of the general population on community and government forests by
encouraging private tree planting efforts (NPC 1998: 299). Just as Wu and Pretty (2004:91) argue
that top-down development may be neither successful nor sustainable, our results reinforce the need
for community-level targeting to achieve such forest conservation goals. While not to diminish the
critical needs in other areas of poverty alleviation, etc. in Nepal, as demonstrated here, positive steps
towards forest conservation can be achieved through encouraging and facilitating social networks
directly related to forest user groups. The policy implication is that through information spillovers
such targeting of aid and education can leverage the conservation potential in rural communities and
households themselves. Finally, these results are also consistent with the small sample, communitylevel investigation of Varughese and Ostrom (2001) on the positive impacts of local forestry groups.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Description

Mean

Std.
Dev
6.812 62.715

Number of trees planted by household (on their own
private land) in the survey year (1995/96).
Social network index related to Forest user groups
0.08 0.224
SNF
FfW
0.175 0.416
Social network index related to Forest user groups,
SN
farmer groups, and Water user groups
Social network index related to all groups: Forest user
0.363 0.824
SNFfWwco
groups, farmers groups, Water groups, womens groups,
credit groups, and other groups.
fWwco
Social network index of all groups but forest user groups
0.282 0.695
SN
Age of Household head (in years)
44.724 14.443
AGE
Number of years in school for household head
2.94
3.56
EDUCATION
Household size (total persons, adults and children)
5.681 2.811
HHSIZE
Total area of landholding by household (in ha.)
0.922 1.776
TOTLAND
Dummy indicator for firewood as primary source of
0.734 0.442
FIREWOOD
energy used by the household (=1 if yes, else 0)
Dummy indicator variable of Mountain ecological belt
0.154
0361
MOUNTAIN
for household’s location (=1 if Mountain, else 0)
Dummy indicator variable of Terai ecological belt for
0.418 0.493
TERAI
household’s location (=1 if Terai, else 0)
Dummy indicator variable of electricity availability in
0.203 0.402
ELECTRICITY
the community where ith household is located (=1 if yes,
else 0)
Dummy indicator variable of household’s caste (=1 if
CASTE
Brahmin or Kshitriya, else 0)
0.352 0.478
Dummy indicator variable of household’s religion (= 1 if
RELIGION
Hindu, else 0)
0.866 0.341
Dummy indicator variable of household’s mother tongue
LANGUAGE
(= 1 if Nepali, else 0)
0.743 0.437
Dummy indicator variable whether household
NDISASTER
experienced major natural disaster in the past 5 years (=
1 if yes, else 0).
0.497 0.500
Note: No. of observations (n) = 2657
NT

Source: Calculated from Nepal Living Standards Survey, 1995/96. Central Bureau of Statistics,
Nepal.
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Table 2: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) Regression Results (dependent variable: NT)
Model-IA Model-IB Mode-IIA Model-IIB Model-IIIA Model-IIIB Model-IVA Model-IVB Model-V
1.96
2.02
(4.67***) (4.88***)
0.99
1.05
-

F

SN

SNFfW
FfWwco

SN

-

-

SNfWwco

-

-

(3.88***) (4.26***)
-

-

0.47

-

-

-

-

(1.52)
-

(1.66*)
-

-0.06

-0.05

-

-

(-0.20)
-

10.21

-

(3.17***)
-

IV-SN

-

-

-

-

-

-

IV-SNFfW

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

EDUCATION
TOTLAND
FIREWOOD
MOUNTAIN
TERAI
AGE
HHSIZE
ELECTRICITY
N

-

0.48

(-0.28)
-

F

Model-VI
-

2.98

(2.85***)
0.13
0.13
0.14
0.13
0.14
0.14
0.13
0.12
0.08
0.1
(3.91***) (3.74***) (3.95***) (4.10***) (3.70***) (4.14***) (2.96***) (2.96***) (1.81*)
(2.30**)
0.15
0.08
0.17
0.11
0.2
0.13
0.18
0.12
0.19
0.21
(1.26)
(0.5)
(1.41)
(0.8)
(1.45)
(1.05)
(1.59)
(0.81)
(0.53)
(1.64)
0.84
0.96
0.83
0.95
0.76
0.87
0.89
0.98
0.5
0.61
(2.29**) (2.52***) (2.30**) (2.55**) (1.98**) (2.27**) (2.43**) (2.65***)
(1.21)
(1.48)
0.68
0.87
0.66
0.85
0.42
0.52
0.1
0.01
1.86
1.1
(2.29**) (2.01***) (2.27**) (2.19**)
(1.43)
(1.47)
(0.28)
(0.28)
(3.07***) (2.52**)
-0.33
-0.17
-0.25
-0.14
-0.48
-0.35
-0.59
-0.59
0.22
-0.21
(-0.92)
(-0.45)
(-0.67)
(-0.40)
(-1.44)
(-0.95)
(-1.22)
(-1.31)
-0.48
(-0.49)
0.01
0.01
0.02
0
0
0
-0.01
-0.01
0
-0.01
(0.11)
(0.56)
(0.29)
(0.22)
(0.24)
(0.5)
(-0.72)
(-1.06)
(0.37)
(-0.57)
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.07
(1.19)
(1.19)
(1.58)
(1.47)
0.45
0.52
0.37
0.27
(1.64*)
(1.87*)
(1.39)
(0.9)
2657
2657
2657
2657
2657
2657
2657
2657
2357
2357

31

lnL

χ (slope = 0)
α
2

Vuong-Z score
Hausman- χ 2

-2642.7

-2637.9

-2645.29

-2640.2

-2650.53

-2646.74

-2652.3

-2648.7

-2379.08

-2380.96

57.97***
16.5***
4.17***

75.83***
14.37***
4.20***

45.02***
17.43***
4.16***

70.49***
15.43***
4.23***

33.48***
18.85***
4.17***

53.79***
17.08***
4.26***

32.09***
15.01***
4.23***

38.80***
14.09***
4.28***

49.11***
16.40**
-

39.35***
17.41***
-

174.0***

3.42

11.26*

1.61

~0

~0

2.1

4.14

-

-

Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust t-values are within parentheses.
Large positive α supports ZINB against ZIP models. Z-score is Vuong Z-test for ZINB vs. standard negative binomial. Right
hand side variables IV-SNF and IV-SNFfW are instrumented based on the Hausman statistics (Model-IA, and Model-IIA).

32

Table 3: Marginal Effect of SN indices on Tree Planting (TN)

ModelIA
8.29
(3.12***)
-

ModelIB
7.66
(2.45**)
-

SNFfWwco

-

-

SNfWwco

-

-

-

IV-SNF

-

-

IV-SNFfW

-

-

SNF
SNFfW

ModeIIA
-

ModelIIB
-

ModelIIIA
-

ModelIIIB
-

ModelIVA
-

ModelIVB
-

-

-

-

-

2.52
(2.23**)
-

-

-

-

-

-

2.79
(2.24**)
-

-

-

-

-

1.04
(1.72*)
-

-

-

1.06
(1.64*)
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

4.41
4.2
(2.94***) (2.82***)
-

Note: Robust t-values within parentheses. IV-SNF and IV-SNFfW denote that SNF and SNFfW are instrumented

ModelV
-

ModelVI
-

46.25
(2.59***)
-

13.91
(2.24**)
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Table 4: Difference in Marginal Effects of SN due to Different SN Composition

SNF
SN Index
SNF

Model
IA

SNFfW
IIB

FfWwco

SN

SN

V

VI

6.62
(2.99***)

-

-

41.84
(3.92***)

-

0

-

3.46
(3.74***)

0

-

1.62
(3.70***)

0

-

1.68
(3.60***)

0

-

1.73
(2.78***)

0

-

1.48
(2.82***)

0

-

IIIA

3.35
(3.37***)

IIIB
fWwco

IVB

0

5.14
(3.31***)

IVA
7.23
(3.52***)

IV-SNFfW

IIA
3.88
(4.29***)

IIB

IIIB

IV-SNF

IB

IIA

IIIA
5.50
(3.84***)

SNfWwco

IA

IB
SNFfW

SNFfWwco

3.16
(3.30***)

IVA

-

43.46
45.19
(3.42***) (3.17***)
45.19
12.87
(3.07***) (2.78***)

IVB
0

IV-SNF

V

IV-SNFfW

VI

0

Note: Pair-wise Z-score within parentheses. IV-SNF and IV-SNFfW denote that SNF and SNFfW are instrumented

32.34
(3.42***)
0
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